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A MIRROR FOR STATESMEN 
LEONARDO BRUNI’S HISTORY OF THE FLORENTINE PEOPLE
* 





It will perhaps seem odd to claim that Leonardo Bruni’s History of the Florentine 
People has been neglected by students of Renaissance political thought. Written over 
the space of a quarter century, between 1415/16 and 1442, it was the civic humanist’s 
most important original work. When the famous Florentine chancellor died in 1444 he 
was laid out at his public funeral on a bier clasping a copy of the History against his 
breast, a pose later preserved by Bernardo Rossellini in a portrait sculpture for the 
Bruni tomb in Santa Croce.
1  The work was an official history, preserved in the chapel 
of the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence along with the Pandects of Justinian (captured at 
the conquest of Pisa in 1406), the banners of defeated foes, and other civic trophies.
2  
It survives in some sixty manuscripts and was translated into Italian by command of 
Bruni’s employer, the Florentine Signoria; the translation, by Donato Acciaiuoli, was 
also widely circulated in manuscript and was printed a number of times in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
3 Then and now it was considered one of the greatest 
works of humanist historiography and was the model for an entire genre of city-state 
histories in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
4   2 
  Yet despite its obvious importance as a major monument of Renaissance civic 
humanism, the work has been neglected by historians of political thought. Surveys 
like Quentin Skinner’s classic Foundations of modern political thought and his more 
recent collection Visions of politics, Antony Black’s Political thought in Europe, the 
Cambridge history of political thought and its Italian equivalent, the multivolume 
Storia delle idee politiche, economiche e sociali, all tend to rely on a handful of 
shorter texts such as the Laudatio Florentinae urbis, the oration for the funeral of 
Nanni Strozzi, and the treatise On knighthood when characterizing Bruni’s political 
thought.
5  The History of Florence, on the other hand—when not dismissed as mere 
Livian pastiche confected from vernacular chronicles—has been studied for its 
historical methodology; for its place in the history of humanistic historiography; as a 
work revealing a republican ideology of liberty; as a work of imperialistic 
propaganda; as a rhetorical artifact; as a moment in the history of historical 
consciousness; and as a secular vision of historical development.
6  
While all these perspectives are interesting and useful, they miss one 
distinctive, indeed key trait of Bruni’s pioneering history: its didacticism. Bruni’s 
history is intended as a work of moral education. It is meant to teach Florentine and 
Tuscan political elites how to behave with virtue, how to preserve and extend the 
power of their respublica. It shows them which policies and laws worked in the past 
and which did not work, and why.  Its didacticism is sustained and explicit 
throughout.  It is far more explicitly pedagogical than either its main source, Giovanni 
and Matteo Villani’s chronicle, or its chief model, Livy. Bruni instructs his audience 
both in summaries and asides addressed directly to the reader or in the form of 
speeches delivered by admirable Florentines.
7  His didacticism is implicit as well, for 
Bruni certainly knew Aristotle’s view, expressed in Rhetoric 1.9, that praise could be   3 
deployed as a form of moral counsel. The History of the Florentine People is on the 
surface a celebration of the city’s accomplishments, but Bruni is always counseling 
while he is praising: urging modern Florentines to live up to the accomplishments of 
their ancestors and not to repeat their mistakes.
8 
It is the contention of this article that attending to what Bruni takes to be the 
great lessons of Florentine history greatly sharpens and in part corrects our picture of 
Bruni as a political thinker and therefore of the political thought of civic humanism in 
general.  In particular, it should change our view of Bruni’s relationship to the 
Aristotelian tradition and to Machiavelli.  Bruni is usually described as an Aristotelian 
in his political theory, and this seems plausible on the face of it given the many years 
of labour Bruni devoted to the translation of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics as well as 
the pseudo-Aristotelian Economics, not to mention his own explicit statements that he 
was a follower of Aristotle.
9  But study of the History shows us that in certain crucial 
respects Bruni rejected Aristotle’s political ideals. For example, both Aristotle 
(Politics 7.2) and Plato (Laws 1.628b) criticise constitutions designed with a view to 
imperial expansion; both see such a constitution as disordered, as enshrining a 
mistaken preference for the active over the contemplative life, for the life of the 
emotions and honour over the life of reason and self-mastery. But Bruni’s History 
passionately endorses the goal of glory and the acquisition of territory.  For example, 
in a speech put into the mouth of Pino della Tosa, who is advocating before the 
Florentine Signoria the purchase of Lucca in 1329, Bruni writes: 
 
And just think, too, how much your power will increase when you get control of 
this most beautiful and well-fortified city-state, with such a large territory and 
so many towns and citadels!  Think how much the glory, fame and majesty of 
the Florentine People will grow if a city which has long been nearly our equal   4 
in wealth and power should be made subject to you!  For my part, I confess, as 
one who practices the common life and moral customs of mankind, I am moved 
by the things that men hold to be goods:  extending borders, enlarging empire, 
raising on high the glory and splendor of the state, assuring our own security 
and advantage.  If we say that these are not desirable things, then the welfare of 
the republic, patriotism and practically this whole life of ours will be 
overthrown.  If those who would dissuade you from taking Lucca despise such 
things and think them of no account, they are in their turn introducing new 
moral standards into life; if they approve of them and consider them goods, then 
they must necessarily believe that Lucca should be taken, for so many goods 
and advantages follow together therefrom (6.5).
10 
 
There can be little doubt that this speech reflects Bruni’s own views.  He explicitly 
states, when Florence fails to take Pino’s advice, that it was ‘an extremely bad 
decision on the city’s part’.  And the speech occurs at the beginning of Book VI, 
which is mostly devoted to Florence’s failed attempt to take control of Lucca. The rest 
of the book in effect shows the high cost of this bad decision: enormous expense, loss 
of life, shame, military failure, and in the end, the tyranny of Walter of Brienne, all 
result directly from this colossal error in political judgement. 
Bruni’s History also reveals a civic humanism far less concerned with 
promoting classical virtues in the service of the good life, as presented by Greco-
Roman philosophers, and far more concerned with finding pragmatic solutions to 
pressing political and ethical problems threatening the welfare of the state. Bruni’s 
central concern is with enabling a virtuous civil life so as to increase Florentine 
political and military strength. To some extent this means finding ways to inculcate 
classical virtues such as prudence, moderation, courage, love of country, and thrift.  
But Bruni’s search for lessons in history takes him in new directions not explored by 
classical historians. Thucydides, Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus all obviously expect their   5 
readers to acquire prudence from study of the past, but they do not develop a theory of 
political success or failure; success or failure is typically seen in moral terms without 
remainder. Polybius of course does have a theory of Roman success, but when 
elaborating it he has, in effect, to stop his narrative (at the end of Book V) in order to 
launch into a synchronic, abstract analysis of the Roman constitution, religion and 
military customs in Book VI.  Bruni’s approach, by contrast, is both analytical and 
intrinsically historical; his explanations of Florentine success and failure both 
motivate and derive from the narrative.  Prudence and imprudence are shown in 
action.  A favourite maxim is that ‘time and experience, the mistress of affairs’ reveal 
the truth. So, for example, the longevity of the institution of the Priorate shows that it 
was good and well-designed (3.58-59).
11 Outcomes are the judge of prudence. To be 
sure, Bruni does not dissent from the basic assumption of ancient ethics, that practice 
of the virtues is the key to happiness, both private and public. But his understanding 
of political happiness as consisting in the wealth, strength and imperialistic success of 
one’s native city imports a Roman note alien to ancient Greek political theory.
12 It 
issues in a strikingly different, proto-Machiavellian analysis of political virtue.  For 
Bruni, virtue is already trending towards virtù. 
Bruni’s History gives his fellow-citizens counsel in four broad areas:  
diplomacy, the conduct of war, the design of laws and institutions, and the nature of 
vivere civile, i.e., the best forms of behaviour for citizens to practice. Although these 
are all interrelated, the present article will focus on his lessons about citizen behaviour 
and how such behaviour is supported, or not supported, by laws and institutions. 
Like most modern historians of Florence, Bruni identifies factionalism as the 
main obstacle to Florence’s success in the late medieval period. Factionalism had 
various causes. There were foreign ones, like the struggle between pope and empire;   6 
and domestic ones, such as rivalry between noble clans or class struggles between the 
nobility and the people.  The term People or popolo has a precise meaning for Bruni, 
as it did for contemporaries, and signifies the broad middle ranks of society, 
excluding magnates or nobles on the one hand and the mob on the other.  In the 
thirteenth century the middle stratum of society organized itself politically and formed 
a corporation for the purposes of self-protection, with its own statutes, offices, 
military organization, coats of arms, seals, and banners. From its earliest appearance 
in Florence it was aligned with the pro-papal Guelf Party against the Ghibellines. This 
well-defined corporate and ideological identity made Florence’s middle classes quite 
unlike those of the ancient Greek city-states described by Aristotle. Again unlike 
Aristotle’s middle class, members of the Popolo are not necessarily middling in 
economic means; as we shall see, the Popolo is distinguished from the magnate class 
primarily by its political culture.  As the full title of the work suggests, The history of 
the Florentine People, the real hero of Bruni’s history is the People of Florence – the 
People in this special, restricted sense.   
Since the People in Florentine history act consistently to suppress the 
hereditary nobility, persecute Ghibellines, and to exclude the poor from political 
power, it is also in Aristotelian terms the name of a faction, a pars, by definition 
opposed to the good of the whole. Given Bruni’s Aristotelian commitments, therefore, 
one might expect from him a cool and critical analysis of the Popolo’s factional 
behaviour. But far from being a philosophical historian, above the fray, Bruni tells the 
story of the People as their partisan.  Throughout the twelve books of the History he is 
an open partisan of the People against a lawless and unpatriotic nobility, against a 
passionate and dangerous mob, and against all Ghibellines. Bruni’s partisanship is in 
aid of his larger goal, which is to encourage Florentines to put loyalty to their city   7 
above loyalty to faction, clan, class or Church. His belief is that the Popolo can and 
should provide a focus for civic loyalty. 
Bruni’s partisanship is evident in his treatment of factional struggles in 
Florence. He describes a number of attempts to bring social peace to Florence and 
assesses their effectiveness. In 1266, during the Guelf restoration following the battle 
of Benevento, the Florentines attempted to pacify the parties by forcing intermarriage 
between Guelf and Ghibelline clans. They believed  the old legend that the Guelf-
Ghibelline split had had its origins in a marriage dispute between the Buondelmonte 
and Amidei families, and reasoned that if a broken marriage had caused the problem, 
successful marriages would solve it – ‘a remedy of opposites’, as Bruni called it. In 
fact, ‘the disease was too serious to be cured by such medicine’, Bruni writes (2.110).  
The policy at the start offered hope but ‘was soon revealed as a wasted effort’.  It 
failed for two reasons. The inequality of power between Guelfs and Ghibellines meant 
that the strong and victorious party could not respect the defeated and weak one, so 
the weaker party was systematically in an inferior position in marriage negotiations.  
Each party regarded the other as traitors and enemies of the fatherland. Second, 
Ghibelline forces outside the city continued to threaten it, which generated suspicions 
within and made mutual trust between factions impossible. 
Bruni also examines five attempts by the Church to make peace within the 
city, all of which fail.  The peace of Gregory X (1273) failed because the pope, 
despite his holiness and good intentions, did not make a realistic assessment of the 
situation.  He did not realize that memory could not be wiped out; he did not 
appreciate that partisans who had shown themselves wicked and deceitful in the past 
could not be trusted in the present; and he was mistaken in believing that intelligent 
citizens would not value their security above pious hopes for peace (3.24). Cardinal   8 
Latino’s peace of 1279-80, by contrast, showed more intelligence and understanding 
of the local situation. Latino was effective in persuading people that they would be 
more secure with both factions inside the city and designed institutions and legal 
procedures to protect both parties.  He arranged formal reconciliations, marriages 
between factions, and even destroyed records of earlier partisan activities to wipe out 
the memory of mutual hatreds. His peace lasted a couple of years, but was ultimately 
undone by the Angevin disaster in the Sicilian Vespers of 1282. A fragile balance of 
parties inside the city could not survive a major shift in the balance of power outside 
it (3.52, 3.58).  Similar pressures and suspicions destroyed three later papal attempts 
at pacification of the quarrels between Whites and Blacks in 1300, 1303, and 1306; 
the last two attempts, indeed, came apart owing to suspicions of the pope’s own 
partisan agenda. In 1306 the papal peacemaker was not even admitted to the city on 
the grounds that the previous peacemakers had only made things worse (4.100).  
Bruni’s conclusion is that whenever one party is stronger than another in the city – 
which will be practically all the time – any solution aiming at the peaceful 
coexistence of factions is doomed to failure. The implication is that exiles are better 
left outside the city. Piety and good intentions cannot abolish history or geopolitics.  
Idealistic attempts at abstract social justice also fail to solve problems arising 
from antagonism between social classes. Bruni teaches this lesson with particular 
clarity at the beginning of Book VII, while describing what happened after the 
expulsion of Walter of Brienne, the French tyrant who briefly dominated Florence in 
1342-3.  In gratitude for the meritorious actions of the nobility in freeing Florence 
from the tyrant, the civic leaders, led by their bishop, Angelo Acciaiuoli, 
understandably but unwisely reverse the half-century-long policy of excluding the 
nobility from public life and allowed them to hold magistracies.   9 
 
What was new, and of the greatest import to the republic, was their decision, 
against the example of earlier times, to accept the nobility into this and other 
magistracies of the republic. There were two principal reasons for this 
decision. One was concern for civic harmony. It was believed that the state 
would be tranquil and the spirits of its citizens quiet and peaceable if no part 
of the city were excluded from honours and thus driven to hate the present 
regime because of injustices to itself. The other reason was manifest merit, 
since the nobility had actively devoted its energies to expelling the tyrant. 
Their actions won still more approval in that the tyrant had granted many 
favors to their class, but they had preferred liberty and love of country to his 
acts of beneficence, which was a great proof of the sincerity of their public 
spirit. So for these reasons the nobility were allowed to share in the 
governance of the state (7.3). 
 
But this innovation turned the ancient constitution (antiqua gubernandi forma) 
upside-down, and subverted the purposes of the old, anti-magnate ordinances. 
 
The latter [ordinances] had been wisely framed in the beginning and 
afterwards preserved in the state with salutary effect. But at this time, the body 
politic had been entirely equalized and through concord made as one; so with 
the sources of contention having lapsed, the safeguards against contention 
lapsed as well (7.4). 
 
The new situation in the abstract seemed just, but it was ineffective. ‘Although [the 
reforming magistrates] seemed to have good reasons for designing the constitution as 
they did, it did not last very long’ (7.6).  The nobility soon began to be suspected of 
abuse of power, leading to unrest among the people.  Envy and contention, ‘the usual 
civic diseases’, returned to the city, and the populares began to think they had 
exchanged one tyrant for many. Eventually verbal contention turned to violence and   10 
civil war. Tranquillity was restored only when the People reasserted its military 
dominance over the nobility and restored the popular regime, excluding the nobles 
(7.10-14). Once again, abstract principles of justice had been undone by political 
reality. The nobility, being naturally prone to arrogance and power-seeking, were 
bound to abuse public power to achieve their ends; and the People, being more 
powerful militarily, was bound to reassert itself.  History and the realities of power 
trumped ideals of political equality. 
Bruni’s preferred solutions to the problems of partisanship and class struggle 
are institutional and moral.  He praises the magistracy of the Priorate (3.59), in terms 
reminiscent of Aristotle, for empowering the middle classes against the nobility.  
Invoking his principle of the mean, Aristotle had written in Politics 4.11 that the 
middle class is the best class to rule because they are most likely to listen to reason. 
The upper classes are given to violence and great crimes, the lower classes to petty 
criminality, but the middle classes don’t covet the goods of others. They know how to 
obey as well as command, unlike the other classes, and they are not consumed with 
ambition. They achieve what they want in a spirit of friendship, and a stable 
community depends on friendship; any good state aims at being as far as possible a 
society of equals and peers.  Only in states with a large middle class, where there is 
rough equality of property, does the possibility of good government exist.  Thus 
Aristotle. 
Bruni’s analysis at first sight appears to echo this general sentiment. Writing 
of the foundation of the Priorate in 1282, he remarks: 
 
This form of administration was populist to the highest degree, as can be seen 
from its very name.  Because there were certain powerful individuals who 
seemed inordinately given to civil discord, the government of the city was   11 
handed over to a quiet and peace-loving sort of person who was more inclined 
to carry on business in peacetime than to engage in war and strife.  That is why 
they were called Priors of the Guilds:  they enjoyed popular approval and 
preference because they were neither predatory nor seditious, but frugal and 
peace-loving persons, each exercising his own métier – for the lazy have to feed 
off the goods of others. (3.59). 
 
But Bruni’s emphasis here is not on the middling economic status of the magistrates – 
indeed he points out that one of the first priors, Jacopo de’ Bardi, was from a noble 
and extremely rich family – but on their moderate behavioural patterns. The 
distinction between magnate and popolano was for him (as for some modern 
historians of medieval Italy) a matter of political culture.
13  Magnates were men who 
admired and emulated the military, bucolic and amatory ways of French chivalry, 
who rode horses in cavalcades through the city streets. They were given to violence 
and motivated principally by anti-social notions of personal honour.
14 For them, 
honour trumped the common good; they would tear the city apart out of misplaced 
loyalty to pope or emperor or clan or party. They lived off rents and could devote 
themselves full-time to military and political pursuits. They had no respect for the 
laws of the city, made by and for the powerless, and preferred private revenge to the 
use of the courts. A good guildsman, by contrast, was somebody who devoted most of 
his efforts to his own business and not to his political ambitions; whose business 
interests made him prefer peace to war; whose experience in trade and commerce 
made him prudent and far-sighted. He could rule and be ruled in turn because he had 
other things to do with his time. Not being able to rely for protection on an ancient 
and powerful clan, he looked to the city and its laws to defend himself against his 
enemies, and therefore his first loyalty was to the city. He did not have a large   12 
clientele whose interests might compete with that of the city. It was obvious to Bruni 
that such a man would make a far better magistrate than a magnate. 
  This is not to say that Bruni wanted his guildsman-citizen to be unmilitary. To 
allow the very lowest classes to take up arms was a capital error, as the Ciompi tumult 
showed (9.1-10).  But the Popolo, ideally, should bear arms. Like most republicans, 
Bruni believed an armed and vigilant citizenry was necessary to defend its own 
prerogatives against powerful forces inside and outside the city. He believed the 
practice of bearing arms required institutional support, which is why he approved of 
the institution of militia companies to protect the Popolo against the domination of the 
magnates. The liberty of the people required them to be organized militarily (2.99). 
There was hardly anything Bruni deplored more in Florentine history than the custom 
that began in 1351 of allowing citizens to purchase exemptions from military service.  
Bruni roundly condemns this practice in a passage that offers a good example of his 
didactic manner: 
 
Many decisions were also taken that winter about raising funds for war. Among 
other blameworthy decisions, those with military obligations in Florentine 
territory were allowed exemption from military service if they paid money to 
the state for hiring foreign and outside soldiers. The only sure effect of this was 
to render the city’s own population unwarlike, so that the citizens would look to 
others to defend their own fortunes, and would not know how to defend 
themselves or fight for their country. These and many similar mistakes of 
statecraft are committed by governors who lack experience, and though small in 
the beginning, such errors later give birth to massive harms (7.101). 
 
In Bruni’s later Constitution of the Florentines (1439), a treatise in Greek describing 
the Florentine constitution in the manner of Aristotle, he remarked that it was this   13 
decision that had led to the emergence of oligarchy in Florence, since the predominant 
use of mercenaries put power into the hands of those who paid for them.
15 
  For Bruni, however, it was not enough that the People be able to defend their 
interests militarily; they also needed the support of the laws in their daily intercourse 
with the nobility. This is why he praises the institution of the Ordinances of Justice in 
1293 and their sponsor, Giano della Bella, who is one of the great heroes of the 
History (4.26-40). Up to that time, says Bruni, the People had been in a relationship of 
‘honourable servitude’ (honesta veluti servitute) with respect to the nobility 
(nobilitas). The nobility had never treated the People as an equal partner.  As a result, 
the common people had suffered violence, arrogant contempt, seizure of goods, 
injustices of every kind, and had been unable to enforce the laws.  The Ordinances 
remedied this situation by placing the nobility under heavy political and legal 
disabilities. They were stripped of political rights and could not serve as magistrates. 
They were subject to heavier punishments and much looser standards of evidence in 
court cases. Clans could be punished for the misdeeds of individual members. The 
laws were enforced against them by a civic garrison of five thousand men 
commanded by the Gonfaloniere of Justice. A special magistrate, the Executor of the 
Ordinances of Justice, was established to deal with magnate offences (4.99). 
It is clear that no orthodox Aristotelian could or should have approved of the 
Ordinances of Justice.  Aristotelian institutions in general and Aristotle’s ideal mixed 
polity in particular were designed with a view to neutralizing partisanship.  Aristotle’s 
aim is to maximize virtue and wisdom in government and to ensure that governors 
rule in the interests of all. But everyone needs to see that his interests are being 
observed, which means allowing each class of persons in the state, rich, middling and 
poor, some voice in their own rule, some degree of participation in their own   14 
governance (Politics 6.4). This in turn requires a careful balancing of oligarchic and 
democratic elements in the design of the constitution. And however the interest of the 
rich and the poor are balanced, the predominant power in the state should be held by 
its wisest and most virtuous citizens, whom Aristotle identifies as the men of ‘free 
birth, wealth, culture, and nobility of descent’. ‘Quality’ should dominate ‘quantity’, 
i.e., the nobler sort should dominate the multitude (Politics 4.12). And the state 
cannot endorse formal injustices to particular classes because this leads only to further 
strife. Law is defined as reason free from passion (Politics 3.16) and should provide a 
check on partisanship by remaining a strictly neutral arbiter. Impartiality of the laws 
is of capital importance and should be characteristic of all constitutions (Politics 
3.15). 
Bruni’s praise of the Ordinances, on the other hand, shows that, like 
Machiavelli, he takes partisanship for granted; he regards it as an inescapable fact of 
political life. Bruni’s History never argues that partisanship can be neutralized in the 
orthodox Aristotelian way, by a mixture of opposites.
16  Bruni instead endorses the 
Florentine solution, to ensure the victory of the best party by legal measures and 
force. In other words, he admires the Ordinances of Justice precisely because they 
institutionalize partisanship. They are explicitly designed to ensure that, in any 
struggle between a popolano and a member of the nobility, the state will back the 
popolano and enable him to compensate for the superior power of the nobleman. The 
laws have to be partial to the weak to protect the weak. 
Bruni takes the same partisan view of the Guelf and Ghibelline factions. The 
Guelfs are the party of the papacy, which is valued because (most of the time) it 
supports the liberty of Italian cities. It is historically the basis of Florentine alliances 
in Tuscany and elsewhere. The Ghibellines are an unpatriotic party consisting of   15 
potential traitors, a party which supports the German barbarians who have usurped the 
name of the empire. The Guelf Party or Parte Guelfa – a semi-public patriotic society 
charged with neutralizing Ghibelline influence in the city – is praised by Bruni as a 
moral censor (2.117).  Although the Guelf Party is later criticized for a lack of 
moderation in persecuting Ghibellines, or supposed Ghibellines (8.19-20), Bruni 
strongly upholds the legitimacy of its role in suppressing pro-imperial partisanship. 
So guildsmen need to rule and they need to make use of institutional 
partisanship – positive discrimination as one might say today – in order to enforce the 
laws against the nobility. And Guelfs need to be able to suppress Ghibelline power: a 
state can only have one foreign policy. At the same time, the People cannot do 
without the wide experience and expert military, diplomatic and legal knowledge of 
the nobility.  Ideally, the nobility and the People should cooperate. Magnates must 
learn to accept that political office is the exclusive possession of the People. They 
must learn to be good Florentines and put country ahead of private interests, even 
though public honours are largely denied them.
17  
Bruni offers in Book XI an example of a great man, Donato Acciaiuoli, who 
failed to be a good citizen. Acciaiuoli was a member of an extremely wealthy and 
powerful popolano family and a leading member of the regime. But he also had many 
friends and clients among the exile communities, nobles and persons accused of 
Ghibelline sympathies. At the end of 1395, in the middle of Florence’s struggle with 
Milan, he made the mistake of putting the interests of his exile friends above that of 
the city and began scheming secretly through his agents in the governmment to have 
them restored to political rights. His scheme was found out and he was summoned 
before the Priors. Either from a sense of citizenship or from arrogance he did not 
appear with armed followers, as his friends were urging, and so he was taken captive   16 
and driven into exile (11.35-6). The following is Bruni’s summation of his behaviour. 
(It is worth keeping in mind that Bruni was composing this book of the History 
between 1439 and 1442 when serving on the Ten of War along with Donato’s 
descendent Angelo Acciaiuoli and Cosimo de’ Medici.) 
 
It was thought that two things most of all stood in the way of this great man: 
first, his excessive and unconstrained power, and second, his excessive liberty 
in censuring others. The former earned him envy, the latter, the ill-will of 
many men. Ambassadors sent to the city frequented his house, and all who had 
some business with the city took refuge with him as with a patron. Not even 
his friends approved of this behavior, and his enemies used to call him, 
calumniously, ‘duke’ and ‘lord’ – so vexing is all preeminence in a free city! 
His excessive freedom of censure was also an obstacle to him. Himself a man 
of blameless life, he could not bear vices in other men and often would 
criticize them. Such censures did not so much help the republic as they injured 
him; citizens in a free city should be advised and directed in a kindly way, not 
criticized insultingly. On these grounds Acciaiuoli was expelled and banished, 
and was deprived of his fatherland. Letters of state were written to his brother, 
a cardinal of the Roman church, explaining the reason for the banishments. 
They said the magistrates had driven  this leading citizen into exile only with 
grief and reluctance, because at an extraordinarily difficult moment he had 
encouraged certain citizens to hope for a  renewal of their political rights and 
restoration; and he  had made preparations so that, if he could not obtain what 
he wanted by public deliberation, he would set about accomplishing it by force 
of arms (11.37). 
 
The city needs great men but they must learn to behave like citizens.
18 Yet the 
People too must learn to defer to the superior expertise of the nobility, especially in 
military and diplomatic affairs. The state needs the nobility as an ‘ornament’ at home; 
they need the wealth of the nobility to embellish the city; they need its guidance in   17 
matters of taste and letters, but above all they need its advice in peace and war.  Bruni 
demonstrates over and over again how failure to accept good advice from military 
experts has led to disaster.   
This, indeed, is one of Bruni’s chief messages of Book II, where the rashness 
and imprudence of a ‘fierce people’; its failure to take the wise advice of illustres viri 
et rei militaris periti led directly to the greatest military disaster in Florentine history, 
the battle of Montaperti (2.36-51).  ‘Plebeians ignorant of the art of war’ (‘the sort 
who tend to predominate in magistracies’, he adds) were so eager for glory and 
plunder that they failed to appreciate the overwhelming advantages of the enemy’s 
position and to see through the Ghibellines’ disinformation campaign. So, foolishly, 
they decided to march out and face the enemy.  At this point a group of nobiles, led 
by Tegghiaio d’Aldobrandi de’Adimari, tried to persuade the magistrates of their 
error, laying out carefully all the advantages and disadvantages of going to war – 
classic Florentine ragione. But all for nought. After Tegghiaio’s speech there arose a 
popolano magistrate named Spedito, ‘the sort of person unrestrained liberty can 
sometimes produce’. 
 
For some time he had barely been able to contain himself as he listened to this 
good advice.  As soon as Tegghiaio had finished speaking, he shouted – his 
limbs and voice shaking with passion – ‘What are you after Tegghiaio?  Have 
you turned into a filthy coward?  This magistracy isn’t going to pay any 
attention to your fears and quakings.  It’s going to consider the dignity of the 
Florentine people.  If you’re paralyzed with fear, we’ll let you off military 
service’ (2.48). 
 
Tegghiaio defended himself with dignity, but the die had been cast. 
   18 
Then, when the rest of those present fell to grumbling and began to defend 
their decision, the magistrates fixed a fine for anyone who debated the matter 
further.  The rashness of the magistrates was assisted by a fierce people, proud 
of its many victories. They wished to march out fearlessly and expose 
themselves voluntarily to battle, not so much out of concern for their allies’ 
perils, nor led by any particular goal, but simply to avoid the appearance of 
being afraid of their enemies.  The best course having thus been shouted 
down, the expedition was prepared with resolve (2.50-51). 
 
The result, of course, was the disaster on the Arbia, the return of the Ghibelline exiles 
and the temporary eclipse of the popolo. 
But here again, Bruni’s Aristotelianism is less than orthodox. He does not take 
for granted that virtue is found predominantly among the rich and noble, but assumes 
that it is fairly widely distributed down the social pyramid.  He is even able to praise 
the virtus et constantia of Michele di Lando, the ringleader of the Ciompi revolt, even 
though the latter is a homo ex minima plebe. Indeed, he is frankly admiring of 
Michele’s ‘natural authority and not ungentlemanly appearance’ (auctoritas quaedam 
nativa et forma viri non illiberalis).
19  Even though the man was from the lowest of 
the plebs, even from the working classes (etsi ex infima plebe ex ipsoque opificio 
prognatum), he nevertheless showed a kind of virtue in restraining the worthless 
desires and malignant wills of the multitude (9.7-10). It is hard to imagine Plato or 
Aristotle finding similar words for Cleon, the demagogue of late fifth-century Athens. 
On the other hand Bruni does not mince words in describing the traitorous and wicked 
behaviour of much of the nobility. Of course Florentine history provided him with 
numerous unavoidable examples of bad behaviour on the part of the nobility. But this 
does not alter the fact that Bruni’s beliefs about the distribution of virtue by classes 
reveal social prejudices quite different from those of Aristotle. His character   19 
descriptions in the History push against the Aristotelian assumption that nature 
divides mankind spontaneously into social pyramids, with virtue and wisdom found 
chiefly at the top among the wealthy and well-born.  Bruni himself manifests a 
prejudice in favour of the optimates on numerous occasions, to be sure, and in his 
personal life he was as deferential to noble families as any other upwardly-mobile 
commoner and immigrant. There are numerous instances in the History where Bruni 
casts an admiring glance upwards at rank and wealth and a contemptuous gaze 
downwards at ‘the dregs’ (faex) of Florentine society.  Yet from an Aristotelian 
perspective it is still remarkable the extent to which Bruni is willing to praise the 
virtue of ordinary, middle-class Florentines and criticize noble behaviour. As far as 
the success of the Florentine state is concerned, the main usefulness of the nobility is 
not their moral virtue but their expert knowledge, wealth, and foreign connections, all 
useful to the state.  
For Bruni, in short, the great virtue of the vivere civile is moderation, and it is 
a principal lesson of the Histories that all classes of citizen need to moderate their 
behaviour. His prescription for civic harmony has far more to do with the Ciceronian 
concept of concordia ordinum than with Aristotle’s careful apportionment of public 
powers among economic classes. For Bruni, the nobility need to accept the authority 
of the People and not attempt to exercise direct power through magistracies.  They 
shouldn’t behave like lords and soldiers when participating in civil society. Within the 
city they need to lay aside their signorial and military characters – appropriate on their 
country estates and in wartime – and treat other citizens with equality and respect.
20 
They should observe the laws and temper their desire for honour. If revenge is called 
for, they should seek redress through the courts, not by violence. They should restrain 
their desire for luxury as it leads to visible inequalities and impoverishes the state.   20 
The Popolo, on the other hand, needs to defer to the experience, expertise and tried 
loyalty of meritorious aristocrats and not be carried away by passion. It should not try 
to persecute the nobility to excess, as that only drives them into the hands of foreign 
enemies (6.93).  It should not abolish proper distinctions for merit out of a misplaced 
zeal for equality (7.24). It should recognize that the nobility give riputazione to a city 
and help beautify it. The example to avoid is that of the French, a naturally incivil 
people whose arrogant nobility treat the common people ‘almost like slaves’ (6.112). 
In sum, Bruni in his Histories often makes use of Aristotelian categories of 
analysis, but his conclusions and the beliefs that support those conclusions are foreign 
to Aristotle.  Bruni uses Aristotle as a rhetorician would – as Cicero would – 
instrumentally, to strengthen his argument for a non-Aristotelian conclusion:  that the 
historian can judge institutions and patterns of citizen behaviour on the basis of their 
tendency to promote or inhibit the well-being and glory of the state. This is strikingly 
different from Aristotle’s goal for political life. Although he states explicitly that 
ethics is a branch of politics and subordinate to it, ultimately Aristotle’s state is meant 
to subserve human flourishing in both the active and contemplative lives.  In the end, 
Aristotle sees a non-political activity, contemplation for its own sake, as the highest 
human activity. That is why Aristotle condemns any constitution designed with a 
view to expansion and empire (for example the Spartan), because it falsely privileges 
the honour-seeking part of our natures above the rational, knowledge-seeking part.  In 
choosing between what Machiavelli would call ‘a republic for preservation’ and ‘a 
republic for expansion’, Aristotle sides with the republic for preservation (or 
longevity).  Bruni resembles Machiavelli in wanting both longevity and expansion for 
Florence. He does not, to be sure, share Machiavelli’s radical view that the rules of   21 
morality are fundamentally different from the rules of political success. But he does 
share his instrumentalized analysis of institutions and citizen behaviour patterns. 
  An example from Book XI will help illustrate the point. The date is 1399, and 
Giangaleazzo of Milan is tightening the noose around Florence, taking control of one 
town after another in Tuscany until Florence is surrounded on all sides by enemies. 
The Florentines had an opportunity to break the chain of antagonists the previous year 
when the pro-Florentine ruler of Pisa, Gherardo d’Appiano, secretly offers them an 
alliance, via his representative Giovanni Grassolini, if only the Florentines will pay to 
send him a large bodyguard to protect his position in Pisa. Since Pisa is traditionally 
Ghibelline and anti-Florentine, Gherardo is in a weak position. But the Florentines see 
Gherardo’s entreaty as a request to support tyranny, and refuse it. Instead of keeping 
the negotiations secret, they hold a large public meeting where they conclude it would 
not be in keeping with the dignity of the Florentine People to buy friendship. As a 
result, Gherardo, whose position has become untenable, is bribed by Giangaleazzo to 
abandon the lordship of Pisa to him. The same thing happens when the Perugians 
offer alliance in return for military support against the pope, who is trying to reassert 
his lordship over that city. The Florentines refuse because they are too good Guelfs to 
oppose the pope, but the result is that Giangaleazzo takes control of another 
neighboring city. Thus the Florentines’ misplaced sense of honour, exaggerated 
respect for the pope, and ideological opposition to tyranny blinds them to their true 
interests. It leads them foolishly to refuse alliances which would have stopped 
Giangaleazzo in his tracks.  
Bruni lets us know what he thinks of these actions in a speech of the oligarch 
Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi, another of his heros, before a large political meeting, or 
practica, in the Palazzo Vecchio (see Appendix).  It effectively summarizes Bruni’s   22 
views about the weaknesses of popular governments when engaging in military affairs 
as well as his ideas about how those weaknesses might be remedied.
21 What Bruni 
advocates in this passage is clearly a species of political realism. The existential threat 
of defeat in war requires that the Florentines place the good of the state first and 
shelve, at least temporarily, their traditional religious deference to the pope, their 
constitutional safeguards against overmightly citizens, and their folk prejudices in 
favor of popular decision-making and public debate of policy. Bruni observes a 
tendency for popular governments to manifest ‘sloth and negligence’ and calls for 
vigor in the executive. Thus Gianfigliazzi advocates constituting a war commission 
(presumably a Dieci di Balìa or Ten of War) consisting of wise and virtuous citizens 
to take charge of the state’s foreign policy, who can act with the swiftness and secrecy 
required for successful warfare, untrammelled by the usual cumbersome decision-
making processes of the commune. Not coincidentally, this was a magistracy on 
which Bruni himself served three times in the period when he was writing the last 
three books of his History.
22 Like Machiavelli (Discourses 1.8), Bruni sees the envy 
of small men as an obstacle to the emergence of great leaders and would like to see 
steps taken to prevent slander and judicial harassment. Above all, Bruni manifests a 
respect for armed force and a certain contempt for citizens who always advocate 
peace, whether from religious or economic motives, and fail to recognize the need for 
strength in foreign affairs. His preference is for a standing professional army rather 
than citizen levies.  The good citizen should prefer peace but when the state’s interests 
are best preserved by war, he should be ready to support war. 
  Bruni’s prescriptions for civic harmony and for acquiring strength and prestige 
internationally take him very far from the usual pieties of humanist educational 
thought, including those contained in his own De studiis et literis.
23  That work and   23 
other humanist educational treatises are largely in the Isocratean tradition of 
cultivating one’s abilities and virtues so as to achieve personal honour and distinction.  
The state benefits indirectly, by possessing virtuous political elites. The humanists’ 
technique for acquiring distinction is study of the classics, which means emulating 
Roman linguistic and behavioural patterns, on the assumption that the ancients were 
better, more glorious, more wise, more powerful than the specimens of humanity 
found in the corrupt modern world. Ancient eloquence and shining examples of 
ancient virtue would of themselves inspire us to live better lives.   
Bruni in the Histories is using a different economy of persuasion. He is urging 
his fellow-citizens to act with virtue because their history shows that failure to do so 
leads to collective shame and disaster. (This is perhaps why Bruni’s history spends so 
much more time on Florence’s failures than on her successes.)  He does not promise 
that an individual’s virtue will be rewarded with a flourishing life in every case – as, 
indeed, is shown by the fate of his hero, Giano della Bella, who was stripped of his 
property and expelled from the city by his ungrateful fellow-citizens (4.40).  But he 
does promise that the city whose ruling classes behave with virtue will be free, 
powerful and glorious.  Perhaps they will even prove themselves destined for 
universal empire, like ancient Rome. But that is the promise of a Roman statesman 
like Cicero, not a philosopher like Aristotle. And Bruni’s mode of analysis, his 
subordination of private virtue to the glory of the state, and his attempt to establish 
loyalty to the state above all other loyalties to party, class and even to the Church, 
shows that his closest kinship as a political thinker is not with Aristotle, Polybius, 
Thomas Aquinas, nor even with Ptolemy of Lucca, but with Machiavelli.   24 
APPENDIX 
 
SPEECH OF RINALDO GIANFIGLIAZZI BEFORE THE FLORENTINE PRIORS, 1399 
FROM THE HISTORY OF THE FLORENTINE PEOPLE, 11.75-78 
 
 
We must all give you the greatest thanks, most excellent Priors, that, in this 
most difficult time, when everything is awash in uncertainty and suspicion and 
dangers manifest themselves on all sides, you have resolved to consult your 
citizens about the security of the republic. For when magistrates neglect 
dangers and take no counsel, they generally allow scope for irreparable ruin. I 
shall give my view faithfully and I ask you to forgive me if I some things I say 
are said with excessive freedom, for the truth must not always be silent. For 
my part I confess that the dangers now besetting the city are great, but I am 
afraid not so much on account of those dangers themselves as on account of 
our own character. For as long as I can remember I have always seen us, 
because of our sloth and negligence, feebly losing the opportunity in every 
enterprise to take provident action. The reason for this evil is that the people 
and the mob do not look to the future and do not sense dangers until they 
actually occur; and outstanding men, if there are any among us involved in 
governing the state, although they may foresee dangers, nevertheless dare not 
and cannot forestall them. For so great is the freedom to calumniate in this city 
of ours that no sooner does someone explain the danger and advise taking 
action against it than many people start shouting that he is a warmonger and 
can’t bear peace, and they hedge him in with malicious laws and tie him up 
with a thousand difficulties and prohibitions. So even if someone wants to take 
precautions for the security of the republic, he is left no way to do it! Thus it 
happens that we flee from opportunities and do nothing. But when dangers are 
at the doorstep and cannot be avoided, then – finally! – do we become alarmed 
and take advice, then we summon the Council of Two Hundred and the 
Council of One Hundred and Thirty together to discuss a matter and a business 
from which there is no escape.   25 
I should not be so upset if our struggle was with another popular 
regime, for then the positions of both parties would be equal, or nearly so. But 
our present struggle is not with another popular regime but with a tyrant, who 
is ceaselessly awake to his own interests, does not fear slanderers, is not held 
back by malicious laws and does not wait upon the decree of the mob or the 
deliberations of the people. So it is not to be wondered at if he strikes first in 
conducting his affairs, while we are still pondering remedies when our affairs 
are already lost. Certain of our citizens took extremely poor advice and 
rejected the Pisan Giovanni Grassolini when he offered us alliance and 
confederation with the Pisans, spurning the advice of those who pointed out 
the danger of that city coming into Giangaleazzo’s power. If that danger had 
been blocked then, we would not be beset with dangers as we are now. 
Recently, too, certain men took equally bad advice and rejected the Perugian 
envoys who came to us to inform us of the dangers they were in and asking to 
join our confederation and alliance. They shouted that the men who thought 
they should join were trying to start a new war against the pope. The 
Perugians then turned to Giangaleazzo and have now, I believe, been taken 
over by him.  
Now we are at last starting to think about the danger threatening us 
from that source. We should blame no one but ourselves; nothing has made 
the Duke of Milan’s power in Tuscany grow more than our own sloth and 
weakness. But what has been done up to now cannot be changed. In future, 
however, if you do not rein in calumnies of this sort and excessive license in 
belittling others and the impediments that stand in the way of quick action, 
you may expect no remedy for your condition. But if you wish to correct 
behavior of this sort and take correct counsel from us, there is still good hope 
that we may preserve, not only our liberty, but our prestige (status) as well. 
For we do have a large and wealthy city, a wide dominion, many towns 
besides, a large and strong population and almost innumerable fortified 
citadels. Our adversary will come to realize that it is a harder matter to crush 
us than he thinks, if we have the will to act as men and protect the position and 
the liberty left us by our forebears.  
But above all it is necessary to remove now the evils I have just 
enumerated from the city. Let there be some vigilant persons in the state who   26 
have the power to act without being compelled to refer every single thing to 
the multitude and wait upon their decree. State affairs generally require 
swiftness and secrecy, things which are very much at odds with mass decision-
making. Let the slanders and indictments of calumniators against great men 
cease. Let everyone understand the grave perils that threaten them and the 
great virtue and industry and expense it will require to ward them off. Only 
after these steps have been taken at home, I think, should we make provision 
for foreign affairs; let us provide ourselves with soldiers and a captain-general 
who may stand ready for our expeditions. We shall be more respected by both 
friends and enemies if they see we have sufficient power about us; if we lack 
such power, everyone will despise us. This is my general advice.    27 
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